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Painfulness,	Desire,	and	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma	
	
Michael	S.	Brady	
	
Abstract		The	traditional	desire	view	of	painfulness	maintains	that	pain	sensations	are	painful	because	the	subject	desires	that	they	not	be	occurring.	A	significant	criticism	of	this	view	is	that	it	apparently	succumbs	to	a	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma:	the	desire	view,	it	is	argued,	is	committed	to	an	implausible	answer	to	the	question	of	why	pain	sensations	are	painful.	In	this	paper	I	explain	and	defend	a	new	desire	view,	and	one	which	can	avoid	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	This	new	view	maintains	that	painfulness	is	a	property,	not	of	pain	sensations,	but	of	a	pain	experience,	understood	as	a	relational	state	constituted	by	a	pain	sensation	and	a	desire	that	the	sensation	not	be	occurring.					 	
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Painfulness,	Desire,	and	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma		
	What	makes	pains	painful?	The	desire	view	of	painfulness	maintains	that	painfulness	is	an	extrinsic	quality	of	pain	sensations.	In	particular,	the	view	holds	that	pain	sensations	count	as	painful	because	the	subject	is	averse	to	them	or	desires	that	they	cease.	Now	there	is	much	to	be	said	in	favour	of	the	desire	view.	First,	by	appealing	to	desire	we	can	capture	the	heterogeneity	of	painful	experiences;	to	this	extent	the	desire	view	seems	preferable	to	internalist	accounts,	such	as	phenomenological	or	felt-quality	views,	which,	notoriously,	struggle	on	this	score.1	Second,	by	appealing	to	desire	we	capture	the	platitude	that	painfulness	has	intrinsic	motivational	force,	desire	being	an	intrinsically	motivating	state;	to	this	extent	the	desire	view	seems	preferable	to	rival	externalist	accounts,	such	as	evaluativism	and	imperativism,	which,	arguably,	struggle	to	explain	why	painfulness	and	motivation	are	thus	connected.2		The	desire	view,	however,	itself	faces	a	number	of	serious	objections,	and	perhaps	the	most	challenging	of	these	is	a	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	According	to	this	objection,	the	desire	view	is	committed	to	an	implausible	answer	to	the	question	of	why	pain	sensations	are	painful.	At	the	heart	of	this	criticism	is	the	claim	that	desires	lack	the	normative	force	to	enable	the	view	to	capture	what	is	supposed	to	be	a	platitude	about	painfulness:	that	the	painfulness	of	some	sensation	gives	one	a	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	act	so	that	the	painfulness	ceases.	In	this	paper	I	want	to	argue	that	the	desire	view,	as	traditionally	understood,	is	indeed	undermined	by	this	criticism.	However,	I	also	want	to	
	 3	
argue	that	a	view	in	the	vicinity	–	that	is,	a	view	which	holds	that	painfulness	necessarily	depends	upon	desire	–	can	both	avoid	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	and	(not	unrelatedly)	capture	the	platitude	that	painfulness	necessarily	gives	one	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	act.	To	anticipate,	the	view	I	want	to	defend	maintains	that	painfulness	is	not	a	property	of	pain	sensations	themselves,	but	is	instead	a	property	of	a	pain	experience,	where	this	is	understood	as	a	relational	
state	consisting	of	a	pain	sensation	plus	a	desire.	If	I	am	right,	then	those	who	think	that	painfulness	is	necessarily	grounded	in	desire	will	have	good	reason	to	adopt	my	view,	rather	than	the	desire	view	as	traditionally	understood.	Or	so,	at	least,	I	want	to	suggest.3		In	§	1	I	outline	how	the	desire	view	is	traditionally	understood,	and	explain	how	it	is	susceptible	to	a	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	In	§	2	I	consider	a	response	to	the	problem	on	behalf	of	the	desire	theorist,	and	argue	that	it	is	unsuccessful.	In	§	3	I	diagnose	the	problem	for	the	traditional	desire	view,	and	suggest	a	different	way	of	viewing	the	necessary	connection	between	pain	sensations,	desires,	and	painfulness.	In	§	4	I	explain	how	this	new	desire	view	of	painfulness	manages	to	avoid	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma	and	captures	the	normativity	that	painfulness	is	supposed	to	have.	And	in	§	5	I	argue	that	the	new	desire	view	is	not	susceptible	to	a	new	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	but	will	give	the	same	answer	to	these	Euthyphro-type	questions	as	its	opponents.			 1.			According	to	the	desire	view,	painfulness	can	be	explained	by	appeal	to	two	elements.	The	first	is	a	pain	sensation.	On	many	popular	accounts,	this	is	
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regarded	as	a	“somatosensory	perceptual	experience,”4	and	so	painfulness	necessarily	involves	“a	form	of	bodily	perception.”5	Some	versions	of	perceptualist	accounts	are	representationalist.	O’Sullivan	&	Schroer	write	that	on	this	view,	“my	pain	experience	discriminates	(i.e.,	makes	me	aware	of)	a	throbbing	bodily	state	in	my	ankle	by	representing	my	ankle	as	having	a	pulsing	disorder;	my	pain	experience	discriminates	a	state	of	minor	damage	in	my	back	by	representing	my	back	as	undergoing	mild	and	brief	damage,	etc.”6	Other	accounts	deny	that	such	sensations	have	representational	content,	typically	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	not	obvious	that	pain	sensations	represent	what	the	representationalists	propose.7	But	whether	representationalist	or	not,	the	desire	theorist	denies	that	sensations	are	sufficient	for	painfulness,	since	it	seems	possible	for	a	subject	to	experience	a	pain	sensation	and	yet	fail	to	suffer	or	fail	to	experience	anything	painful.8	Those	who	take	the	phenomenon	of	pain	asymbolia	seriously	think	this	is	indeed	possible,	in	which	case	a	representation	of	bodily	disturbance	will	not	suffice	as	an	explanation	of	painfulness.	Some	other	element	is	needed,	one	that	on	this	view	makes	the	pain	sensation	painful.			The	desire	view	holds	that	pain	sensations	are	painful	when	the	subject	desires	that	the	sensation	cease	–	or	more	correctly,	desires	that	the	sensation	not	be	occurring.	Defenders	of	this	kind	of	view	in	the	pain	literature	include	William	Alston,	David	Armstrong,	Richard	Brandt,	Richard	Hall,	Christopher	Heathwood,	Christine	Korsgaard,	Derek	Parfit,	George	Pitcher,	and	(the	early)	Michael	Tye.9	On	Christopher	Heathwood’s	version	–	which	is	perhaps	the	most	developed	example	of	the	desire	view	in	the	current	literature	–	“[a]	sensation	S,	occurring	at	time	t,	is	unpleasant	at	t	iff	the	subject	of	S	desires,	intrinsically	and	
de	re,	at	t,	of	S,	that	it	not	be	occurring	at	t.”10	Heathwood	is	here	talking	about	
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unpleasantness	in	general,	but	we	can	adapt	the	account	to	be	about	pain	in	particular	by	restricting	S	to	one	of	the	class	of	pain	sensations.11	In	what	follows,	I’ll	take	Heathwood’s	account	to	be	the	desire	view	as	traditionally	understood;	this	is	not	a	misnomer,	if	we	think	that	his	account	does	the	best	job	of	presenting	an	account	that	many	other	philosophers	have	held	over	the	years.		As	stated,	the	desire	view	faces	a	very	serious	objection	–	namely,	that	it	succumbs	to	a	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	In	particular,	the	desire	view	is	thought	to	be	problematic,	because	it	implies	an	implausible	answer	to	Euthyphro-type	questions.	Consider	a	pain	sensation	experienced	by	a	normal,	non-asymbolic	subject	called	Paige,	which	is	thus	experienced	by	Paige	as	painful.	And	suppose	we	ask,	of	this	sensation,	whether	(i)	it	is	painful	because	Paige	desires	that	the	sensation	cease,	or	whether	(ii)	Paige	desires	that	the	sensation	cease	because	it	is	painful.12	The	case	against	the	desire	view	rests	upon	the	fact	that	(ii)	seems	by	some	distance	the	most	natural	and	plausible	explanation.	If	so,	however,	then	we	have	good	grounds	to	reject	the	desire	view,	since	a	better	explanation	of	painfulness	is	at	hand.		An	initial	response,	on	behalf	of	the	desire	theorist,	would	be	to	ask	her	opponent	to	justify	the	claim	that	(ii)	is	indeed	the	more	plausible	explanation.	Why,	the	desire	theorist	might	ask,	should	we	think	that	our	intuitions	in	this	instance	are	correct?	But	here	the	critic	of	the	desire	view	can	offer	more	in	the	way	of	support.	One	obvious	point	to	raise,	which	mirrors	the	structure	of	the	original	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	is	that	(i)	seems	suspect	because	the	attitude	in	question	seems	arbitrary	or	rationally	ungrounded.	(In	the	original	version	of	the	dilemma,	recall,	the	claim	that	an	action	is	pious	because	loved	by	the	gods	appears	suspect,	because	the	love	of	the	gods	is	in	this	case	ungrounded	and	
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arbitrary.)	If	it	is	not	the	case	that	Paige	desires	that	the	sensation	cease	because	the	sensation	is	painful,	then	we	seem	to	lack	any	explanation	at	all	for	Paige’s	desire	in	particular,	and	for	desires	directed	at	this	kind	of	sensation	in	general.	Unless	we	appeal	to	the	painfulness	of	pain	sensations,	therefore,	the	fact	that	all	normal	humans	do	desire	that	pain	sensations	cease	seems	utterly	mysterious	and	inexplicable.	So	that’s	why	answer	(ii)	seems	natural	and	plausible.		This	argument	against	the	desire	view	is	unconvincing,	however,	since	the	claim	that	the	relevant	desire	is	mysterious	and	inexplicable	unless	we	appeal	to	the	painfulness	of	the	relevant	sensation	is	false.	Indeed,	there	is	an	obvious	explanation	for	why	creatures	like	us	desire	that	pain	sensations	cease,	and	one	that	makes	no	appeal	to	the	painfulness	of	the	sensations.	Instead,	this	explanation	relies	upon	the	reliable	connection	between	pain	sensations	and	various	kinds	of	bodily	damage	or	disturbance.	In	other	words,	a	non-arbitrary	explanation	of	why	we	desire	that	pain	sensations	cease,	and	one	that	doesn’t	appeal	to	any	alleged	property	of	painfulness	that	the	sensations	possess,	simply	notes	the	adaptive	advantage	of	having	such	desires.	For	given	the	reliable	connection	between	these	sensations	and	bodily	damage,	those	who	desire	that	the	sensations	cease	will	be	motivated	to	deal	with	such	damage,	and	increase	their	chances	of	survival.	As	Richard	Hall	puts	the	point,	“animals	that	are	genetically	disposed	to	dislike	[pain]	sensations	and	which	react	accordingly	(i.e.,	by	behaving	in	ways	that	tend	to	stop	or	reduce	these	sensations)	live	longer,	reproduce	more,	and	are	selected	for.”13	To	be	sure,	this	explanation	does	not	appeal	to	features	of	the	pain	sensation	that	constitute	a	subject’s	motivating	
reasons,	since	the	connection	between	sensations	of	this	kind	and	bodily	damage	might	be	beyond	her	ken,	or	in	any	case	motivationally	inert.	But	why	should	this	
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matter?	Non-arbitrariness	does	not,	I	take	it,	require	a	person-level	explanation	of	why	someone	desires	as	she	does.	As	a	result,	appeal	to	this	kind	of	evolutionary	story	suffices	to	undermine	the	charge	of	arbitrariness	laid	against	the	desire	view’s	answer	to	Euthyphro-type	questions.		Unfortunately	for	the	desire	theorist,	this	is	only	a	temporary	reprieve.	For	her	opponent	can	argue	that	what	really	lies	behind	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	at	least	when	directed	at	accounts	of	painfulness,	isn’t	a	charge	of	arbitrariness,	but	the	charge	that	the	desire	view	cannot	capture	the	normativity	that	painfulness	is	meant	to	have.14	Let	me	explain.	Suppose	it	is	true	that	one	has	good	reason	to	desire	that	some	pain	sensation	cease,	in	cases	where	that	sensation	accurately	indicates	bodily	damage.	One	has	good	reason	in	this	instance	because	so	desiring	is	a	way	of	dealing	appropriately	with	said	damage.	However,	what	of	cases	where	the	pain	sensation	does	not	indicate	bodily	damage	–	indeed,	what	of	cases	where	we	know	that	our	pain	system	is	going	wrong	and	that	there	is	no	damage	or	disturbance	that	our	pain	is	correlated	with?	In	such	cases	it	is	also	true	that	the	one	has	good	reason	to	act	so	that	the	painful	pain	ceases.	In	other	words,	painful	pains	necessarily	give	one	good	or	justificatory	pro	tanto	reason	to	act	so	that	the	sensation	ceases;	they	give	us	good	reason	whether	or	not	they	are	indicative	of	bodily	damage.	The	worry	for	the	desire	view	is	that	it	is	badly	placed	to	capture	this	platitude	about	painfulness	and	normative	reasons,	namely	the	platitude	that	we	necessarily	have	good	reason	to	act	so	that	painful	pains	cease.	For	desires	don’t	–	so	the	argument	goes	–	necessarily	give	us	good	or	justificatory	pro	tanto	reasons	to	do	things.15	So	this	is	what’s	really	wrong	with	the	desire	theorist’s	claim	that	the	painfulness	of	some	sensation	depends	upon	a	desire	that	the	sensation	cease,	and	hence	with	answer	(i)	to	Euthyphro-
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type	questions:	such	a	desire	will	fail	to	necessarily	provide	a	pro	tanto	justificatory	reason	to	act,	and	so	fail	to	adequately	capture	the	normativity	of	painfulness.		To	see	this,	note	that	many	of	our	actual	desires	can	be	normatively	suspect:	perhaps	some	of	the	things	we	presently	want	are	based	upon	false	beliefs,	or	are	such	that	they	would	be	extinguished	if	we	knew	a	little	more	about	their	objects,	or	are	ad	hoc	and	fit	poorly	with	the	rest	of	our	desires	and	other	attitudes.16	It	is	doubtful	that	such	desires	give	us	good	reason	to	do	what	they	incline	us	to	do.	For	instance,	if	my	desire	to	run	in	the	London	Marathon	is	based	upon	the	false	belief	that	this	is	a	good	way	to	strengthen	my	knees,	then	I	don’t	have	a	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	enter	the	race.	Or	if	my	desire	to	enlist	in	the	Foreign	Legion	would	disappear	if	I	knew	more	of	what	life	as	a	legionnaire	was	like,	then	here	too	we	might	think	that	I	lack	good	reason	to	enlist.	On	this	view,	the	mere	fact	that	one	has	some	desire	doesn’t	suffice	to	give	one	good	reason	to	act.	As	a	result,	an	explanation	of	painfulness	that	appeals	to	desire	fails	to	capture	one	of	the	central	features	that	painfulness	is	supposed	to	have.	The	desire-theorist’s	answer	to	Euthyphro-type	questions	is	therefore	inadequate,	and	the	desire	view	of	painfulness	implausible.			In	the	next	section	I’ll	consider	a	possible	response	that	the	desire	theorist	can	make,	and	argue	that	it	is	unsuccessful.	In	the	sections	to	follow	I’ll	propose	the	shape	that	a	desire	view	ought	to	take	if	it	is	to	avoid	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	and	in	so	doing	capture	the	normativity	of	painfulness.					
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2.			The	claim	against	the	desire	view	as	traditionally	understood	is	that	mere	desires	seem	to	lack	the	status	or	authority	to	guarantee	the	necessary	relationship	between	painfulness	and	good	or	justificatory	reasons	to	act.	Faced	with	this	kind	of	objection,	a	defender	of	the	view	that	painfulness	necessarily	depends	upon	desires	might	argue	that	the	relevant	desires	are	not,	as	it	turns	out,	normatively	suspect,	but	in	fact	pass	muster.	If	so,	it	will	follow	that	the	subject	always	has	good	reason	to	act	on	them.		To	see	this,	note	that	a	common	defence	strategy	employed	by	subjectivists,	who	hold	that	justificatory	reasons	depend	upon	our	desires,	is	to	appeal,	not	to	the	desires	we	actually	have,	but	to	the	desires	that	we	would	have	in	certain	idealized	or	improved	conditions.	On	plausible	versions	of	subjectivism,	what	we	have	good	reason	to	do	is	grounded	in	a	subset	of	our	actual	desires:	what	is	rational	for	me	is	not	necessarily	what	I	presently	want,	but	what	I	would	want	(or	want	that	my	actual	self	want)	were	I	to	be	in	certain	idealized	or	improved	circumstances.17	But	accepting	that	our	actual	desires	sometimes	fail	to	live	up	to	the	relevant	normative	standards	is	compatible	with	thinking	that	painfulness	nevertheless	depends	upon	our	desires:	for	our	actual	desires	do	not	fail	to	live	up	to	the	relevant	standards	when	it	comes	to	pain	
sensations.	Instead,	our	desiring	that	a	pain	sensation	cease	is	a	desire	that	we	would	have	under	idealized	conditions,	or	a	desire	that	our	fully	rational	selves	would	have	about	our	actual	pain	sensations.	As	a	result,	what	seem	like	‘mere	desires’	succeed	in	capturing	the	normativity	of	painfulness	because	such	desires	are,	as	it	turns	out,	normatively	adequate.		
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Consider,	in	support,	the	following	from	David	Sobel.	He	writes:	“subjectivists	should	claim	that	intrinsic	favouring	and	disfavouring	attitudes	ground	reasons	when	they	are	accurately	informed	about	what	their	object	is	like.	Such	desires	are	more	fully	for	their	object	as	it	really	is	than	for	the	object	as	it	is	falsely	believed	to	be	…	Desires	for	current	phenomenology	are	uniquely	accurately	and	fully	informed	about	their	object.	Indeed,	it	might	now	seem	a	mark	in	the	subjectivist’s	favour	that	we	think	that	the	cases	in	which	we	have	the	most	confidence	that	our	desires	carry	normative	authority	are	cases	in	which	we	are	most	confident	we	have	excellent	access	to	accurate	information	about	what	certain	options	are	like.	Matters	of	mere	taste	(where	desires	are	commonly	allowed	to	carry	authority)	tend	to	be	cases	where	we	have	uncommon	access	to	the	relevantly	informed	vantage	point.”18		Sobel’s	point	is	that	desires	concerning	current	phenomenology,	and	hence	desires	concerning	current	pain	sensations,	do	indeed	possess	normative	authority,	because	we	are	already	in	an	ideal	or	informed	epistemic	position	with	respect	to	these	objects.	Unlike	desires	to	enter	the	London	Marathon	or	to	enlist	in	the	Foreign	Legion,	where	we	might	be	unaware	of	what	these	things	would	be	like	were	they	to	be	attained	and	hence	where	our	epistemic	situation	could	be	improved,	or	where	the	desires	don’t	fit	with	any	other	of	our	mental	states	and	are	thus	ad	hoc,	desires	concerning	our	current	phenomenal	states	are	not	capable	of	epistemic	improvement,	and	to	this	extent	count	as	meeting	the	relevant	normative	standards.	So	a	criticism	about	the	lack	of	reason-giving	power	of	mere	desire	doesn’t	apply	to	accounts	of	painfulness	in	terms	of	current	pain	sensations	that	we	want	to	cease.		
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This	is	an	intriguing	reply.	But	it	fails	to	provide	an	adequate	defence	of	the	desire	view	as	traditionally	understood,	since	we	can	doubt	that	we	are	always	in	an	ideal	epistemic	situation	with	respect	to	our	current	phenomenal	states.	Consider,	to	illustrate,	an	example	which	focuses	on	a	broader	experience	of	unpleasantness,	but	which	can	be	modified	to	make	a	similar	point	with	respect	to	painfulness.	The	example	focuses	on	the	taste	sensation	of	a	filet	mignon	steak.	Experiencing	the	taste	of	a	well	cooked	and	high	quality	filet	mignon	steak	is,	for	most	carnivores,	very	pleasant.	And	let	us	suppose	that	our	subject,	Carol,	is	one	of	those	people:	Carol	enjoys	the	taste	of	filet	mignon	very	much.	On	the	desire	view	of	pleasantness,	Carol’s	experience	in	such	instances	consists	of	a	bodily-gustatory	sensation	that	she	strongly	wants	to	continue.	Suppose	now	that	Carol	is	dining	on	what	is	in	fact	high	quality	filet	mignon	in	a	fancy	restaurant,	but	is	informed	that	it	is	horse	meat	she	is	tasting.	This	state	is	one	that	is,	I	assume,	unpleasant	for	many	carnivores.	And	suppose	that	Carol	is	one	such:	Carol	finds	the	taste	of	what	she	thinks	to	be	horse	meat	very	unpleasant.	Carol	would,	in	this	case,	strongly	desire	that	the	taste	sensation	cease.	However,	this	is	not	a	sensation	that	she	would	strongly	desire	to	cease	if	she	were	better	informed:	if,	that	is,	she	were	informed	that	she	is	actually	eating	filet	mignon	and	not	horse	meat.	As	a	result,	Carol	undergoes	an	unpleasant	gustatory	experience,	even	though,	were	she	better	informed,	she	would	not	want	the	taste	sensation	to	cease.	It	is	therefore	false	that	in	matters	of	taste	we	are	uniquely	accurately	and	fully	informed	about	the	objects	of	our	desires	and	aversions.	As	a	result,	it	cannot	be	the	case	that	unpleasantness	is	a	matter	of	what	a	subject	would	desire,	were	she	fully	informed.	Something	similar	can	be	said	about	painfulness.	Painfulness	is,	after	all,	simply	a	form	or	kind	of	
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unpleasant	experience,	and	so	the	same	argument	will	apply	with	respect	to	this	negative	affective	state	as	well.		At	this	point	someone	might	claim	that	even	if	the	argument	goes	through	with	respect	to	unpleasantness,	it	does	not	apply	with	respect	to	pain.	For	we	do	stand	in	a	privileged	epistemic	relation	to	pain,	such	that	mistakes	about	pain	are	not	possible.	It	is,	after	all,	a	staple	of	common	sense	and	traditional	thinking	that	if	we	think	that	we	are	in	pain	then	we	are,	and	if	we	are	in	pain	then	we	think	that	we	are.19	But	it	seems	to	me	that	this	confidence	in	our	infallibility	when	it	comes	to	pain	is	misplaced.	In	support,	think	of	the	difficulty	we	sometimes	have	in	determining	whether	some	sensation	–	say,	of	an	ice	cube	on	one’s	skin	–	is	painful,	or	merely	very	cold.	It	is	often	not	clear	to	us	when	we	are	in	pain	in	such	cases,	which	raises	the	possibility	of	our	being	in	pain	and	yet	not	realising	this.	By	the	same	token,	there	can	be	cases	where	someone	thinks	that	they	are	in	pain	–	say,	a	young	child	who	overreacts	to	a	minor	injury	–	and	yet	are	who	is	not	in	pain,	as	indicated	when	the	child	immediately	stops	crying	upon	being	told	“stop	making	a	fuss,	that	doesn’t	hurt.”	If	so,	we	are	not	uniquely	and	fully	informed	about	the	objects	of	our	desires	in	cases	of	pain	sensations,	any	more	than	we	are	in	cases	of	unpleasant	sensations	in	general.			 3.		In	this	section	I	want	to	diagnose	why	the	traditional	desire	view	fails,	and	propose,	in	the	light	of	this	diagnosis,	a	more	plausible	way	of	understanding	the	necessary	relationship	between	painfulness,	pain	sensations,	and	desire.		
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In	my	view,	the	mistake	made	by	the	traditional	desire	theorist	is	akin	to	that	made	by	those	who	favour	a	narrow-scope	reading	of	another	necessary	relationship,	namely	the	instrumental	principle	that	governs	our	means-end	reasoning.20	To	see	this,	note	that	nearly	everyone	agrees	that	in	some	sense	one	has	good	reason	to	take	the	means	that	are	necessary	to	achieve	one’s	ends.	But	there	are	two	ways	in	which	to	understand	this	principle	or	requirement.	On	the	narrow-scope	reading,	if	I	have	some	end,	then	I	ought	to	take	the	necessary	means	to	that	end.	The	reason	or	ought	in	this	case	attaches	to	the	means	that	are	needed	to	secure	the	end	in	question.	On	the	wide-scope	reading,	however,	what	I	have	good	reason	to	do	is	either	take	the	means	to	my	end,	or	relinquish	the	end.	Formally,	with	E	as	end,	M	as	means,	and	R	as	justificatory	reason,	the	narrow-scope	reading	holds	that	E	à	RM	,	whilst	the	wide-scope	reading	holds	that	R	(EàM).	Now	one	very	good	reason	to	reject	the	narrow-scope	reading	of	the	instrumental	principle	is	that	it	permits	the	generation	of	justificatory	reasons	to	do	what	I	clearly	lack	any	good	reason	to	do.	Suppose	that	my	end	E	is	to	become	the	shortest	philosopher	in	my	department.	And	suppose	that	the	only	way	I	can	achieve	this	would	be	to	undergo	height-reduction	surgery.	On	the	narrow-scope	reading,	then,	the	fact	that	I	have	this	end	entails	that	I	have	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	undergo	height-reduction	surgery.	But	I	take	it	that	I	don’t	have	any	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	do	this.	The	mere	fact	that	I	have	some	end,	and	that	something	is	a	necessary	means	to	achieving	this	end,	does	not	imply	that	I	therefore	have	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	take	the	means	to	achieve	my	end.	The	relation	between	ends,	means,	and	good	reasons	cannot	be	as	the	narrow-scope	reading	of	the	instrumental	principle	supposes.		
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It	seems	to	me	that	the	traditional	desire	view	is	guilty	of	the	same	kind	of	error.	This	view	can	be	regarded	as	starting	from	the	(admittedly	less	widely	accepted)	thought	that	painfulness	necessarily	depends	in	some	way	upon	the	relation	between	desires	and	pain	sensations,	and	then	proposing	a	narrow-scope	reading	of	this	relation.	On	this	way	of	understanding	the	relation,	if	I	desire	that	some	pain	sensation	cease,	then	this	is	enough	to	make	that	pain	sensation	painful:	the	painfulness	attaches	to	the	pain	sensation	that	is	the	object	of	my	aversion.	Because	of	this,	the	narrow-scope	reading	implies,	along	with	the	platitude	that	painfulness	necessarily	provides	good	or	justificatory	reasons,	that	if	I	desire	that	some	pain	sensation	cease,	then	I	have	a	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	act	so	that	the	sensation	ceases.	And	this	claim,	as	we	have	seen,	is	implausible,	since	mere	desires	like	normative	authority.		If	the	problem	is	that	the	desire	view,	as	traditionally	understood,	employs	a	narrow-scope	reading	of	the	relation	between	painfulness,	pain	sensations,	and	desire,	then	the	solution	for	those	who	wish	to	maintain	that	painfulness	is	necessarily	grounded	in	desire	might	now	seem	obvious:	adopt	a	wide-scope	reading	of	this	relationship.	The	new	desire	view	of	painfulness	will	hold	that	painfulness	does	not	attach	to	the	pain	sensation	itself,	but	instead	is	a	property	of	the	pain	sensation	plus	a	desire	that	this	sensation	cease.	It	is	not	a	pain	sensation	that	is	painful,	therefore,	but	the	experience	of	having	a	painful	
sensation	that	one	wants	to	cease.21	Seen	in	this	way,	painfulness	is	an	evaluative	property	of	a	relation	–	akin	to,	say,	the	property	of	the	strength	of	a	marriage	–	rather	than	a	property	of	one	of	the	relata.	In	the	next	section	I’ll	explain	how	understanding	the	relation	between	painfulness,	pain	sensations,	and	desire	in	
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this	way	can	enable	us	avoid	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	and	(not	unrelatedly)	capture	the	normativity	that	painfulness	is	thought	to	have.			 4.		Recall	that	the	problem	for	the	desire	view,	as	traditionally	understood,	is	that	it	is	susceptible	to	a	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	For	suppose	we	ask,	of	some	pain	sensation	experienced	by	a	normal	subject	Paige,	whether	(i)	it	is	painful	because	the	Paige	desires	that	it	cease,	or	whether	(ii)	Paige	desires	that	the	sensation	cease	because	it	is	painful.	The	desire	view	is	committed	to	answering	(i),	whereas	answer	(ii)	appears	to	be	more	natural	and	more	plausible.	However,	from	the	standpoint	of	our	new	desire-based	account	of	painfulness,	according	to	which	painfulness	is	a	property,	not	of	a	pain	sensation,	but	of	the	relation	between	the	sensation	and	a	desire	that	it	cease,	there	is	no	longer	a	worry	for	the	desire	theorist,	since	she	is	not	committed	to	answering	(i)	rather	than	(ii).	For	since	on	this	new	desire	view	it	is	the	experience	of	having	a	pain	sensation	that	one	wants	to	cease	that	is	painful,	then	it	is	on	this	view	false	that	the	sensation	is	painful	because	one	desires	that	it	cease.	The	new	desire	view	is	not	therefore	committed	to	the	implausible	claim	that	desiring	that	some	sensation	cease	makes	that	sensation	painful.	Does	this	mean	that	the	new	desire	view	makes	desire	redundant,	because	it	is	committed	to	answering	(ii)	instead?	Not	at	all.	For	since	it	is	the	experience	of	having	a	pain	sensation	that	one	wants	to	cease	that	is	painful,	then	on	this	view	it	is	also	false	that	one	desires	that	the	sensation	cease	because	it	is	painful.	The	new	desire	view	is	not	therefore	committed	to	the	claim	that	painfulness	is	an	intrinsic	property	of	pain	
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sensations	themselves,	and	hence	independent	of	desire.	If	we	move	beyond	a	traditional	understanding	of	the	desire	view,	we	see	that	Euthyphro-type	questions	are	no	longer	problematic.		This	might	allow	our	new	desire	view	to	deal	with	the	letter	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma,	at	least	in	this	formulation.	(I’ll	consider	a	revised	version	of	the	Dilemma	in	the	final	section.)	But	what	of	its	spirit?	What,	that	is,	of	the	objection	at	the	heart	of	the	dilemma,	that	painfulness	has	normative	implications	–	namely,	that	it	necessarily	provides	the	subject	with	a	reason	to	act	–	and	the	desire	view	cannot	capture	this?	The	traditional	reading	of	the	desire	view,	if	we	recall,	struggled	to	explain	capture	this,	because	it	wasn’t	at	all	clear	why	desiring	that	a	pain	sensation	cease	necessarily	gave	us	good	reason	to	act	so	that	it	ceased.	For	mere	desires,	to	repeat,	lack	the	kind	of	normative	force	or	authority	to	generate	good	reasons	to	act.	However,	on	my	account	painfulness	is	a	property	of	the	relation	between	a	pain	sensation	and	a	desire	that	it	cease;	what	is	painful	is	the	experience	of	having	a	pain	sensation	that	one	wants	to	stop.	And	if	we	accept	this	account	then	we	are	in	a	much	better	position	to	capture	the	platitude	about	the	normativity	of	painfulness.	This	is	because	we	do	always	have	good	reason	to	act	so	that	we	are	no	longer	in	the	relational	state	in	question.	The	move	to	a	wide-scope	reading	of	the	relationship	between	painfulness,	pain	sensations,	and	desire	thus	enables	the	desire	view	to	capture	the	normativity	that	painfulness	has.	To	see	this,	suppose	that	I	am	in	the	following	state:	I	have	a	pain	sensation	that	I	want	to	cease.	Note	that	there	are	two	ways	in	which	I	might	rid	myself	of	this	state.	I	can	either	(i)	act	so	that	the	pain	sensation	ceases,	or	(ii)	act	so	that	I	rid	myself	of	the	desire.	If	I	do	either	of	these	things,	then	I	will	no	longer	
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be	in	a	painful	experiential	state.	But	it	seems	to	me	that,	given	the	nature	of	the	desire	in	question,	I	do	indeed	always	have	good	or	justificatory	reason	to	do	either	(i)	or	(ii).	For	note	that	there	are	two	ways	of	viewing	the	relevant	desire	that	the	sensation	cease.	Either	(a)	the	desire	is	faulty	or	non-ideal	from	the	normative	standpoint,	insofar	as	it	is	one	that	I	wouldn’t	have	if	I	were	better	informed	or	more	idealized;	or	(b)	the	desire	is	one	that	I	would	have	in	idealized	conditions.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	I	always	have	good	reason	to	do	what	I	can	to	get	myself	out	of	the	relational	state	in	question.	For	if	(a)	is	true	and	the	desire	is	faulty	or	non-ideal,	then	I	have	reason	to	get	rid	of	it;	for	I	always	have,	plausibly,	good	reason	to	rid	myself	of	faulty	or	non-ideal	desires.	But	if	(b)	is	true	and	the	desire	isn’t	faulty,	then	I	have	good	reason	to	get	rid	of	the	sensation,	since	this	is	a	sensation	that	my	fully	rational	or	idealized	self	would	want	me	to	get	rid	of.	And	a	desire	that	our	fully	rational	or	idealized	self	would	have	is	one,	we	might	think,	that	has	the	requisite	normative	or	justificatory	power.22		If	this	is	correct,	then	the	new	desire	view	of	painfulness	–	which	maintains	that	painfulness	is	a	property	of	the	relation	between	a	pain	sensation	and	a	desire	that	the	sensation	cease	–	can	explain	what	the	desire	theory	as	traditionally	understood	cannot,	namely	why	painfulness	necessarily	gives	us	good	or	justificatory	pro	tanto	reason	to	act	so	that	the	painful	experience	cease.	Moreover,	the	new	desire	view	can	explain	this	without	having	to	accept	Sobel’s	implausible	view	that	desires	about	our	current	phenomenological	states	cannot	be	mistaken.	If	so,	then	the	new	desire	view	manages	to	avoid	both	the	letter	and	the	spirit	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.				
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5.		There	is	a	final	move	that	the	critic	of	the	desire	view	might	make:	they	might	hold	that	the	new	desire	view	succumbs	to	a	new	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma.	That	is,	even	if	the	new	desire	view	avoids	giving	the	wrong	answer	to	Euthyphro-type	questions	as	originally	formulated,	it	is	committed	to	giving	the	wrong	answer	to	a	set	of	Euthyphro-type	questions	when	these	are	modified	to	refer	to	painful	experiences	rather	than	pain	sensations.	For	all	that	I’ve	said	above,	therefore,	the	new	desire	view	is	still	committed	to	an	implausible	explanation	of	the	painfulness	of	pain.	For	suppose	we	ask,	of	some	normal	subject	Paige	and	some	painful	experience	E,	whether	(i)	E	is	painful	because	Paige	desires	that	E	ceases,	or	whether	(ii)	Paige	desires	that	E	ceases	because	E	is	painful.	Here	again	(ii)	is	considerably	more	natural	and	plausible	than	(i),	in	which	case	the	new	desire	view	is	once	again	committed	to	an	implausible	explanation	of	painfulness.		However,	this	will	only	prove	problematic	if	the	new	desire	view	is	indeed	committed	to	answering	(i)	rather	than	(ii).	But	now	that	we	have	seen	the	shape	that	the	new	desire	view	should	take,	it	should	be	obvious	that	the	new	desire	view	is	in	fact	committed	to	answering	(ii)	when	faced	with	the	relevant	questions,	and	hence	the	new	desire	view	gets	the	right	answer	to	revised	Euthyphro-type	questions.	To	see	this,	recall	that	the	new	desire	view	maintains	that	what	makes	painful	experiences	painful	is	that	they	are	constituted	by	a	subject’s	desire	that	a	pain	sensation	cease.	It	is	expressly	not	the	case,	according	to	the	new	desire	view,	that	what	makes	painful	experiences	painful	is	an	
additional	element,	namely	a	desire	that	this	experience	cease.	So	answer	(i)	is	
	 19	
straightforwardly	incompatible	with	the	new	desire	view.	Moreover,	the	new	desire	view	can	happily	accommodate	the	idea	that	a	normal	subject	desires	that	a	painful	experience	cease	because	the	experience	is	painful,	since	it	is	open	for	her	to	claim	that	in	addition	to	desiring	that	pain	sensations	cease,	normal	subjects	also	typically	desire	that	painful	experiences	cease.	As	Derek	Parfit	puts	the	point,	“[w]hen	we	are	having	some	sensation	that	we	intensely	like	or	dislike,	most	of	us	also	strongly	want	to	be,	or	not	to	be,	in	this	conscious	state.	Such	desires	about	such	conscious	states	we	can	call	meta-hedonic.”23	As	a	result,	the	new	desire	view	will	maintain	that	painful	experiences	are	constituted	by	a	desire	that	a	pain	sensation	cease,	and	typically	generate	a	meta-desire	that	the	painful	experience	ceases.	If	so,	then	the	new	desire	view	will	agree	that	in	our	example,	Paige	desires	that	E	ceases	because	E	is	painful,	and	so	captures	the	most	natural	and	plausible	answer	to	the	new	Euthyphro-type	questions.	The	new	version	of	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma	turns	out	to	be	no	dilemma	at	all	for	the	new	desire	view.	None	of	this	means,	of	course,	that	the	new	desire	view	of	painfulness	is	ultimately	vindicated.	Perhaps	some	form	of	internalist	account,	such	as	a	felt-quality	view,	or	a	rival	externalist	account,	such	as	imperativism	or	evaluativism,	has	theoretical	virtues	that	the	new	desire	view	lacks.	There	are,	after	all,	other	serious	objections	than	can	be	levelled	against	the	desire	view,	whether	old	or	new.	Still,	if	what	I	say	here	is	correct,	the	new	desire	view	about	painfulness	can	answer	one	of	the	central	arguments	to	be	levelled	against	the	approach	by	supporters	of	these	rival	theories.	As	a	result,	I	hope	to	have	left	the	desire	view	in	better	philosophical	shape	than	I	found	it.				
University	of	Glasgow	
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	desire	view.	Nevertheless,	my	arguments	here	will	hopefully	have	some	impact	on	these	other	views,	at	least	to	the	extent	that	their	proponents	tend	to	reject	all	desire	views	on	the	basis	of	Euthyphro-type	arguments.	If	I’m	right,	such	a	rejection	is	too	quick,	and	so	the	motivation	to	adopt	rival	views	–	in	particular,	rival	externalist	views	–	is	somewhat	undermined.		
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12	For	ease	of	exposition,	I’ve	reverted	to	talking	of	desires	that	pain	sensations	cease,	rather	than	desires	that	they	not	be	occurring.	But	strictly	speaking,	the	desires	in	question	are	desires	that	pain	sensations	not	be	occurring.	Nothing	of	substance	in	the	arguments	that	follow	depends	upon	this,	I	think.		
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	14	Bain	(2013)	seems	to	understand	the	the	Euthyphro	Dilemma	in	this	way,	and	both	Bain	(2013)	and	Parfit	(2011)	cast	doubt	upon	the	capacity	of	desire	to	capture	the	normative	status	of	painfulness.	
15	The	claim	that	painfulness	necessarily	gives	us	pro	tanto	reason	is	in	fact	questionable;	Cutter	and	Tye	(2014),	for	instance,	think	it	false.	However,	I’ll	assume	that	that	weight	of	opinion	is	against	Cutter	and	Tye	on	this	point,	and	that	the	claim	is	more	plausible	than	either	the	claim	that	painfulness	only	provides	us	with	prima	facie	reason	to	act,	or	the	claim	that	it	provides	us	with	no	good	reason	to	act	at	all.	Hereafter	I’ll	take	the	qualification	‘pro	tanto’	as	understood.		
16	For	a	helpful	discussion	of	these	kinds	of	failings,	see	Smith	(1994).	
17	For	a	clear	and	persuasive	explanation	of	this	version	of	subjectivism,	see	chapter	5	of	Smith	(1994).		
18	Sobel,	D.	(2011,	p.	59).	
19	I	would	like	to	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	pushing	me	to	be	clearer	about	this	point.		
20	There	is	a	considerable	literature	on	this	issue.	Those	who	defend	a	wide-scope	reading	of	the	instrumental	principle	include	John	Broome,	Jonathan	Dancy,	Stephen	Darwall,	R.	Jay	Wallace,	and	Jonathan	Way.	See,	for	instance,	Broome	(1999),	Dancy	(2000),	Darwall	(1983),	Wallace	(2001),	and	Way	(2010).	A	prominent	dissenting	voice	is	Kolodny	(2005).		
21	Although	the	vast	majority	of	desire	theorists	accept	the	desire	view	as	traditionally	understood,	this	view	of	painfulness	–	in	the	sense	of	what	is	bad	about	pain	–	as	a	relational	property	has	its	supporters.	Thus	Kahane	(2009,	p.	
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	332)	expresses	a	similar	view.	Kahane	describes	objectivism	as	holding	that	“the	state	that	is	intrinsically	bad	is	not	that	of	having	a	sensation	of	pain,	but	that	of	suffering	–	of	having	this	sensation	and	disliking	it.”	Similarly,	Parfit	(2011,	p.	54)	endorses	a	relational	account,	albeit	expressed	in	terms	of	dislike	rather	than	desire:	he	claims	that	“When	we	are	in	pain,	what	is	bad	is	not	our	sensation	but	our	conscious	state	of	having	a	sensation	that	we	dislike.	If	we	didn’t	dislike	the	sensation,	our	conscious	state	would	not	be	bad.”		
22	Is	it	true	that	we	always	have	good	reason	to	rid	ourselves	of	desires	that	we	would	not	have	in	idealized	circumstances?	We	might	be	tempted	to	answer	no	to	this	question	if	we	focus	on	desires	that	aren’t	doing	any	harm:	they	are	not	ideal,	but	nor	are	they	interfering	with	aspects	of	our	epistemic	and	practical	functioning.	(They	don’t	disrupt	our	thinking	or	acting,	let’s	say.)	But	this	temptation	should	be	resisted.	There	is	always	something	to	be	said	for	getting	rid	of	mental	items	that	are	non-ideal,	at	least	other	things	being	equal.	In	support,	think	of	my	having	an	unimportant	but	false	belief.	Even	if	this	isn’t	causing	any	particular	problems	in	my	epistemic	economy,	it	remains	true	that	I	have	pro	tanto	reason	to	rid	myself	of	this	belief	to	the	extent	that	I	can,	simply	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	false.	By	the	same	token,	suppose	I	have	some	trivial	desire	for	something	that	isn’t	good.	Even	if	this	isn’t	causing	any	particular	problems	in	my	practical	economy,	it	remains	true	that	I	have	pro	tanto	reason	to	rid	myself	of	this	desire	to	the	extent	that	I	can,	simply	on	the	grounds	that	it	fails	to	be	an	appropriate	response	to	value.	To	think	otherwise	is	to	think	that	we	are	under	no	normative	pressure	to	make	ourselves	better	off	in	terms	of	our	beliefs	and	desires	when	these	go	astray;	and	that	strikes	me	as	false.	Of	course,	
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	it	is	important	to	stress	the	pro	tanto	nature	of	these	reasons.	In	many	cases	it	won’t	be	worth	the	effort	to	get	rid	of	such	beliefs	and	desires,	and	so	we	don’t	have	all-things-considered	reason	to	always	do	so.	But	this	doesn’t	undermine	the	claim	that	we	always	have	pro	tanto	reason;	and	that	is	all	I	need	to	show	in	order	for	the	desire	view	to	capture	the	normativity	that	painfulness	is	meant	to	have,	since	this	is	also	cashed	out	in	terms	of	pro	tanto	reasons.				
23	Parfit	(2011,	p.	54).																																						
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